birt code 39

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birt code 39

birt code 39

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birt code 39,
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Forest restructuring You can now move existing domains to other locations in the domain hierarchy. More information about this feature is available in 4, Installing and Managing Domains, Trees, and Forests. Forest trusts You can now create a forest trust to extend two-way transitivity beyond the scope of a single forest to a second forest. More information about this feature is available in 4, Installing and Managing Domains, Trees, and Forests. Replication enhancements Linked value replication allows individual group members to be replicated across the network instead of treating the entire group membership as a single unit of replication. New spanning tree algorithms make replication more efficient and scalable across more domains and sites in both Win dows 2000 and Windows Server 2003 forests. More information about this feature is available in 8, Administering Groups. User resource access control between domains and forests You can now block users in a domain or forest from accessing resources in another domain or forest, and then allow users selective access. More information about this feature is available in 9, Administering Active Directory Objects.

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You must understand how trust is validated by cross-certification before you can design the cross certification. However, before considering the unique design issues that accompany the decision to join two hierarchies, consider the way in which trust is validated in a single hierarchy. To validate a certificate, many steps are taken. One of them is certificate chaining and the accompanying validation of each certificate in the chain. A certificate chain defines the path from the root CA through the layers of the intermediary and issuing CAs to the specific certificate being validated. The process of determining the path back to the root CA is called certificate chaining. The following sections describe how the certificate chaining process works and when cross certifica tion can be used.

The following list summarizes the domain- and forest-wide Active Directory features that can be enabled according to domain and forest functionalities. However, these new features pertain to developer activities and are not covered in this training kit.

The certificate chaining process includes these steps: 1. Each CA uses its private key to digitally sign every certificate that it issues. Hence the public key of the CA can be used to prove that a certificate was issued by it. a. If there is only one CA, the root CA, then all certificates will chain or lead directly to it. b. If a hierarchy consists of two levels, a root CA and an issuing CA, then all enduse certificates will chain back to the root CA, but each chain will have an additional link, the issuing CA. The public key of the issuing CA, obtained from its certificate, can be used to validate the signature on the certificate, and the root CA public key can be used to validate the signature on the issuing CA s certificate. c. If a hierarchy is deeper than two levels, each layer in the hierarchy will rep resent a link in the certificate chain but all valid chains will eventually lead back to the root. All certificates can be validated by using the public key of the CA that issued them. Each link in the chain is determined by locating the CA that issued the current cer tificate. This CA is called the parent CA or issuing CA. The operating system can locate the parent CA because the parent CA s name is on the certificate. Figure 2-9 shows the Issuer information for the certificate. 2. Eventually, each certificate in the chain is validated because its chain leads to a trusted root CA. For a root CA to be trusted, its certificate must be in the certificate store of the computer that is attempting to validate a certificate issued by its hier archy, or the trust must be granted by some user action.